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DTN / CGR–SABR — selected stack

IPv4 / TCP / TLS 1.3 / TCPCLv4 / BPv7 + BPSec, with CGR routing procedures from SABR CCSDS 734.3-B-1 (2019). Documentary composition; executable integration not yet qualified. Locally provisioned numeric peers, private IPv4, private-use ipn identifiers (RFC 9758), singleton destinations, supplied contact/range plans and local clocks. Participant-operated certificate trust with NODE-ID validation, no online OCSP, DNS or SNI dependency. Final-pair BCB-AES-GCM payload protection and BIB-HMAC-SHA2 verification with locally provisioned pairwise keys; no relay-held final keys. No application authentication wrapper, anonymity overlay, multicast extension or shared-reference directory. BPv7 mapping of SABR priority/critical metadata and custody-dependent behavior remains an explicit integration question, not silently credited. BPv7 source witness: ION 154a4cc7354b26661169f8d8b75a4002cd509a9f for native final-source delivery and origin-side critical-bundle replication. Exact-origin pairwise keys, primary and payload integrity coverage, and application checks of both verification flags are required. This pins these BP-layer mechanisms only; complete TCPCL/TLS or LTP/Encapsulation/AOS integration, critical metadata propagation at later hops, custody mapping and simultaneous on-wire path use remain unqualified. F16 bounded configuration: F16 alternative witness: ION 154a4cc with optional BSL 468db9b enabled and mandatory APPOUT wildcard-source BIB verification over primary and payload. One authorized remote sender at a time; a fresh secret key is held only by that sender and the final receiver, never transit. Native policy uses a locally fixed key-registry identifier. Revocation uses completed shutdown of receiver and consumers, a fresh empty bundle/fragment/delivery store and a fresh key provisioned only to the newly authorized sender. No hot revocation, simultaneous independent-key allowlist, or claimed source-EID authentication is inferred from this witness; F21 retains its separate exact-source policy. This final BP delivery gate is independent of the chosen CGR route and TCPCL ingress. C06 capability witness uses separate logical contexts with independently provisioned private-domain EIDs, certificates, BPSec keys and stores; no cross-context TLS resumption or common certificate subject/serial is required. F37/F38: optional router-local AQM and independent DiffServ domain enforcement selected in the existing IPv4/TCP transport beneath TLS/TCPCLv4. Policies apply to visible transport aggregates, without inspecting bundles or BPSec payloads. This does not resolve BPv7/SABR priority mapping, application reservation, DTN storage congestion or complete executable integration; no corresponding IP layer is added to the separate LTP/AOS column.

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