Secure DTN — selected stack
IPv4 / TCP / TLS 1.3 / TCPCLv4 / BPv7 + BPSec; independent private IPv4 and RFC 9758 private-use ipn domain; known EIDs, aggregate gateway exits, locally agreed dtn collective names, numeric peers; participant-operated CAs, local trust and BPSec keys, NODE-ID validation, no online OCSP or SNI; optional TLS padding, concurrent proactive forwarding and static collective fanout credited architecturally; independent logical-node EIDs/certificates/BPSec keys per context, no cross-context TLS resumption; discard completed bundles, no retained report archive or transit traffic history G01 global deployment: conventional BGP-routed IPv4 Internet underlay, matching the IP/MQ global case; private deployments remain separate S03 capabilities. F21: ION native BPSec receive-API witness at 154a4cc7354b26661169f8d8b75a4002cd509a9f; exact source-EID/key bindings, distinct pairwise HMAC keys held only by each original sender and receiver, BIBs over primary and payload, primary-inclusive payload integrity scope; application treats bundleSourceEid as authenticated only when both native verification indicators are true. No application authentication exchange, group key or relay-held origin key; no F16 admission/revocation guarantee inferred. F16 alternative witness: ION 154a4cc with optional BSL 468db9b enabled and mandatory APPOUT wildcard-source BIB verification over primary and payload. One authorized remote sender at a time; a fresh secret key is held only by that sender and the final receiver, never transit. Native policy uses a locally fixed key-registry identifier. Revocation uses completed shutdown of receiver and consumers, a fresh empty bundle/fragment/delivery store and a fresh key provisioned only to the newly authorized sender. No hot revocation, simultaneous independent-key allowlist, or claimed source-EID authentication is inferred from this witness; F21 retains its separate exact-source policy. F37/F38: optional router-local AQM and independent DiffServ domain enforcement selected in the existing IPv4/TCP transport beneath TLS/TCPCLv4. Policies apply to visible transport aggregates, without inspecting bundles or BPSec payloads. This does not resolve BPv7/SABR priority mapping, application reservation, DTN storage congestion or complete executable integration; no corresponding IP layer is added to the separate LTP/AOS column.
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