S02-LT: Yes
Rationale
Participants can locally generate the symmetric BPSec key and agree its binding to a private-use EID within their independent domain. The selected local security policy supplies that key; no external cryptographic issuer or CA must authorize it. Counterpart acceptance and private-EID uniqueness still require configuration. This is pairwise identity, not a globally verifiable public-key identity. External lower-layer allocation is separately assessed in S03.
Assessment method
Specification plus pinned receiver-policy analysis; no runtime experiment
Source context
BPSec local key policy and private-use ipn identifier scope
Outstanding qualification
Exercise locally generated key provisioning and exact-origin policy on both participants; reject mismatched bindings. Enforce private-EID domain confinement and verify identifier uniqueness. S03-LT remains Pending for AOS SCID allocation.
Public sources
- https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9173.html#section-3.8.1
- https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9172.html#section-6
- https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9758.html#section-5.5
- https://github.com/nasa-jpl/ION-DTN/blob/154a4cc7354b26661169f8d8b75a4002cd509a9f/bpv7/bpsec/policy/bpsec_policy_rule.c
Editorial evidence references
The following identifiers refer to research records not included in this public package; they are not public links.
- round193-sources.json