K01-RI: No
Rationale
The selected DTLS 1.3 profile explicitly uses external-PSK psk_ke, not a KEM or a hybrid exchange. RFC 8446 section 4.2.9 defines this as PSK-only establishment without a server key_share; RFC 9147 section 5 reuses that handshake construction. K01 expressly requires a suitable post-quantum KEM or justified hybrid. Therefore the selected composition lacks the requested mechanism, on the same basis as the pre-provisioned symmetric-key BP/CG/LT columns.
Assessment method
Specification-based absence of the requested mechanism; cross-column consistency
Source context
TLS 1.3 PSK modes and DTLS 1.3 handshake; existing K01 criterion and selected profile
Outstanding qualification
This No does not assert that symmetric PSK traffic is quantum-breakable. Symmetric security depends on key entropy, provisioning, algorithms and the attacker model. Nor does this verdict add ephemeral forward secrecy to psk_ke. It evaluates the existing KEM-specific definition, not a broader criterion of quantum-resistant confidentiality. The approved profile, cipher suite, F06 verdict and all other cells remain unchanged; no new negotiation or cryptanalytic experiment was performed.
Public sources
- https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8446.html#section-4.2.9
- https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9147.html#section-5
Editorial evidence references
The following identifiers refer to research records not included in this public package; they are not public links.
- cells/K01-BP.html
- cells/K01-LT.html
- round311-sources.json