K01-RA: No
Rationale
The explicitly selected authentication/key-establishment mode accepts EDH and computes its shared secret using classical finite-field Diffie-Hellman. RSA authentication and AES256 content encryption do not supply a post-quantum key-establishment component. No post-quantum or hybrid KEM is selected.
Assessment method
Pinned documentation and authentication source inspection with explicit policy selection; no execution or audit
Source context
IRATI SSH2-inspired authentication policy
Outstanding qualification
No for this declared composition, not a limitation on future RINA policies. The code uses DH_generate_key and DH_compute_key; the README description of EDH as elliptic-curve is inconsistent with this pinned implementation. This decision does not resolve whether application-to-application content is protected end to end.
Public sources
- https://github.com/IRATI/stack/blob/726b535c908f8a74e8c68dd493cfbb1bd8726546/librina/src/security-manager.cc
- https://github.com/IRATI/stack/blob/726b535c908f8a74e8c68dd493cfbb1bd8726546/README.md
- https://github.com/IRATI/stack/blob/726b535c908f8a74e8c68dd493cfbb1bd8726546/rinad/src/ipcp/plugins/sm-auth-psoc/sm-auth-psoc-plugin.cc
Editorial evidence references
The following identifiers refer to research records not included in this public package; they are not public links.
- round665.html