F26-RA: Yes
Rationale
At a protected transit adjacency, rmt_receive requires an existing N-1 port and successful SDU unprotection before decapsulation and onward rmt_send. The selected default crypto policy verifies the packet HMAC and returns failure on mismatch; RMT destroys the rejected packet. Traffic without the local adjacency authenticator is therefore stopped before using the next outgoing link.
Assessment method
Pinned source inspection of selected admission and forwarding policies; no runtime/security test
Source context
IRATI peer-key admission and authenticated SDU forwarding
Outstanding qualification
Scope is established protected transit traffic under the selected authenticated-adjacency policy, not every initial handshake. The ingress medium and local decryption, padding and MAC-verification work have already been consumed. Authorized peers can still send abusive traffic. This credits the explicit authenticated forwarding gate, not encryption alone, a CPU/state service floor, RF-jamming resistance or guaranteed bandwidth.
Public sources
- https://github.com/IRATI/stack/blob/726b535c908f8a74e8c68dd493cfbb1bd8726546/kernel/rmt.c
- https://github.com/IRATI/stack/blob/726b535c908f8a74e8c68dd493cfbb1bd8726546/kernel/sdup.c
- https://github.com/IRATI/stack/blob/726b535c908f8a74e8c68dd493cfbb1bd8726546/kernel/sdup-crypto-ps-default.c
Editorial evidence references
The following identifiers refer to research records not included in this public package; they are not public links.
- round669.html