Participant Relationship Protocol

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F26-PI: Yes

Rationale

PRP architecture section 7.2 derives forwarding state from control-plane policy and route installation. The packet path validates applicable generation, packet protection and replay/sequence state before next-hop dispatch. Intermediate participants use authenticated local forwarding state rather than re-evaluating endpoint relationships. This supplies an authorization boundary before onward transmission and protects subsequent PRP links against traffic that fails that local boundary. It does not require intermediaries to learn the final identity.

Assessment method

Primary architectural and forwarding-policy analysis; no bandwidth benchmark required

Source context

PRP architecture section 7.2, pinned prp-spec e4f9d396b24ff2069708a39bfaf0a568f486efb2

Outstanding qualification

Credit only onward PRP forwarding over the selected IP carrier. Underlying IP routers may already have carried the rejected traffic to this participant; their bandwidth is not protected by this PRP check. Preserve the UDP pre-validation endpoint-allocation concern from round237. No full-underlay DDoS protection or measured implementation conformance follows.

Public sources

Editorial evidence references

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