F26-MT: No
Rationale
The pinned Meshtastic receive gate rejects signature-policy failures, but deliberately retains opaque transit. NextHopRouter::relayOpaquePacket allows opaque forwarding in ALL and also in KNOWN_ONLY: the latter checks whether an outer-header party is known for a PKI-shaped unicast, without authenticating that party before retransmission. It then decrements the hop limit and sends the packet. Thus the selected forwarding composition lacks an enforced authorization boundary for all transit paths.
Assessment method
Primary normative source and selected adjacency-policy analysis; no execution
Source context
Pinned Router receive/decode gate and NextHopRouter opaque forwarding branch
Outstanding qualification
No concerns the selected CLIENT relaying composition and its restricted-mode alternative, not final delivery. STRICT signature checking and F16 endpoint admission remain separate benefits. Opaque forwarding excludes module/phone delivery and uses deduplication and hop limits, but those controls do not establish sender or adjacency authority. This is source analysis, not an executed injection or radio-capacity test; no finding is generalized to other firmware revisions.
Public sources
- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/meshtastic/firmware/8e6a88d06f44cad26f1e8d7cd402939ccacb9b4c/src/mesh/NextHopRouter.cpp
- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/meshtastic/firmware/8e6a88d06f44cad26f1e8d7cd402939ccacb9b4c/src/mesh/Router.cpp
- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/meshtastic/firmware/8e6a88d06f44cad26f1e8d7cd402939ccacb9b4c/src/mesh/Router.h
- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/meshtastic/firmware/8e6a88d06f44cad26f1e8d7cd402939ccacb9b4c/src/mesh/ReliableRouter.cpp
Editorial evidence references
The following identifiers refer to research records not included in this public package; they are not public links.
- round457.html
- round457-sources.json