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F26-LT: No

Rationale

The selected LTP/AOS composition has no link-security admission layer or selected LTP authentication extension. Engine identifiers, contact plans and segment integrity checks do not establish sender authority. Final-pair BPSec verification occurs at delivery, after transit forwarding.

Assessment method

Primary normative source and selected adjacency-policy analysis; no execution

Source context

Primary specification and pinned receive-path source

Outstanding qualification

No is limited to the current composition. RFC 5327 defines optional LTP authentication mechanisms that could support a separately specified admission policy, but no such policy or transit key provisioning is selected here. SDLS and relay-held final BPSec keys are also absent. This is not a claim that LTP cannot support secure adjacency admission.

Public sources

• https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5327.html
• https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5327.html

Editorial evidence references

The following identifiers refer to research records not included in this public package; they are not public links.

• round453.html
• round453-sources.json