F26-CJ: Yes
Rationale
The selected private cjdns peering uses credential-required session admission. InterfaceController requests authenticated handshake handling; the Rust CryptoAuth/Noise paths enforce the requirement. afterDecrypt rejects authentication errors and prevents non-established sessions from sending transit-directed switch messages. Only accepted plaintext reaches the switch interface, protecting onward overlay links against failed adjacency admission.
Assessment method
Primary source admission ordering and selected-role comparison; no execution
Source context
Pinned InterfaceController afterDecrypt and incoming handshake; Rust crypto_auth and crypto_noise authorization branches
Outstanding qualification
Credit the configured private peer credentials, not a public beacon deployment. A peer that passes admission may carry other sources; F16 final-source access remains No. Local handshake/control messages and cryptographic work still occur before full establishment. Existing carrier and route-server costs are not eliminated, and authorized-neighbor flooding remains outside this scoped Yes. No new runtime or bandwidth measurement.
Public sources
- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/cjdelisle/cjdns/f5902acab6dd2f1a68bf6e4c89e352ed71f93698/net/InterfaceController.c
- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/cjdelisle/cjdns/f5902acab6dd2f1a68bf6e4c89e352ed71f93698/rust/cjdns_sys/src/crypto/crypto_auth.rs
- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/cjdelisle/cjdns/f5902acab6dd2f1a68bf6e4c89e352ed71f93698/rust/cjdns_sys/src/crypto/crypto_noise.rs
Editorial evidence references
The following identifiers refer to research records not included in this public package; they are not public links.
- round448.html
- round448-sources.json