F21-RI: Yes
Rationale
The pinned DTLS 1.3 implementation exposes the selected external-PSK identity on the same WOLFSSL object used for protected application records. The server checks the PSK binder and peer Finished before handshake completion. A receiver can therefore map that authenticated identity to its distinct pairwise credential without another application authentication exchange.
Assessment method
Source/API provenance and bounded documentary witness; no execution
Source context
Pinned wolfSSL source and DTLS 1.3 specification
Outstanding qualification
Use one external PSK candidate per connection, unique bounded non-NUL identity strings and distinct pairwise secrets. Call KeepArrays before the handshake; only after successful accept/connect copy get_psk_identity into connection-owned metadata, then FreeArrays. Reject failure, null or unexpected identity; never trust the lookup callback alone. No early data/tickets. Keep metadata bound to that object and discard it at close; a new handshake requires fresh validation. No civil identity, third-party proof, full RPL integration or runtime test is credited.
Public sources
- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wolfSSL/wolfssl/eb113cac674a9f7da61a70a6307a7db959753ccf/src/ssl.c
- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wolfSSL/wolfssl/eb113cac674a9f7da61a70a6307a7db959753ccf/src/tls13.c
- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wolfSSL/wolfssl/eb113cac674a9f7da61a70a6307a7db959753ccf/wolfssl/ssl.h
- https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9147.html
Editorial evidence references
The following identifiers refer to research records not included in this public package; they are not public links.
- round271-sources.json