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F21-RA: No

Rationale

The selected AuthSSH2 mechanism authenticates IPCP peers using locally pinned keys. The application API rina_flow_accept instead returns remote_appl, the requesting application name. The flow allocator passes remote_naming_info to allocateFlowRequestArrived; its selected default security-manager acceptFlow policy accepts that name without validating a binding to an application credential. This path exposes a flow-associated name, not the authenticated IPCP identity or a verified binding from that identity to the final application name.

Assessment method

Pinned application API, incoming-flow notification and selected security-policy trace

Source context

IRATI application API and default flow security policy

Outstanding qualification

No for authenticated final-peer identity exposed to the application in the selected composition. The two-host upper DIF can authenticate the remote host IPCP and protect its traffic, but its authenticated identity is not the identity returned by this application API path. This does not assert an exploitable impersonation attack, deny the transport authentication credited in F07, or exclude a different RINA security policy/API. Application authentication or a new identity-binding interface is not silently added. Source inspection, not a runtime or security audit.

Public sources

Editorial evidence references

The following identifiers refer to research records not included in this public package; they are not public links.