F16-MQ: Yes
Rationale
The existing conditional Yes is supplemented by a native TLS callback witness: a final public-key pin gates the unchanged OpenSSL verifier; a valid fixture certificate outside that pin is rejected with access_denied. Revoking the allowed key and explicitly closing both active connections stops subsequent transport delivery to the test application; a fresh handshake with that revoked key is denied.
Assessment method
Simulated two-connection revocation and exact TLS rejection controls
Source context
Pinned picoquic/Picotls libraries and executed editorial policy harness
Outstanding qualification
A retained policy and application integration are required; QUIC does not automatically supply a final-key policy manager. The witness covers two connections of one identity in separate contexts over simulated links. It does not show selective multi-identity revocation, thread safety or cancellation of work already queued inside an application. No new public implementation or security certification is claimed.
Public sources
Editorial evidence references
The following identifiers refer to research records not included in this public package; they are not public links.
- round296-runtime.json
- round296-sources.json
- round296_policy.c