Back to matrix

F16-LT: Yes

Rationale

The selected pinned ION BPv7 delivery path calls BSL at APPOUT before deliverBundle, irrespective of whether ingress used TCPCL or LTP and irrespective of CGR route selection. Rechecked BSL source creates mandatory verifier operations from wildcard-source rules, treats missing/invalid required BIBs as failures, and marks delete_bundle failures insecure; ION abandons insecure bundles before delivery. Select the explicit round137 two-target policy: mandatory primary/payload BIB-HMAC-SHA2 verification with a locally fixed secret held only by one authorized final peer and the receiver. Revocation is a completed shutdown, fresh empty bundle/fragment/delivery state and independently fresh pairwise key before restart. New authorized service remains possible; old in-flight bundles fail the new key. This is a separately traced final-delivery mechanism for this column, not an inherited Secure DTN verdict.

Assessment method

Primary-document and source-scope analysis; no new full-stack execution

Source context

Primary evidence reviewed 2026-10-15; retained hashes in round228-sources.json

Outstanding qualification

Documentary capability proof with optional native BSL enabled and policy loaded before exposure. One authorized remote key holder at a time; no live multi-peer revocation, retained queued data, application filter, source-EID identity proof or DoS guarantee. F21 keeps its separate exact-source witness. BCB protection remains required. Parser/runtime tests, fail-closed startup, fragmentation, active/queued cutover and complete selected convergence-layer integration still need execution; no full-stack implementation availability is inferred.

Public sources

Editorial evidence references

The following identifiers refer to research records not included in this public package; they are not public links.