F15-TO: Yes
Rationale
The onion-service introduction protocol provides DOS_PARAMS: an explicit token bucket limiting INTRODUCE2 delivery before service-side introduction decryption and rendezvous work. Configure every active introduction circuit with nonzero rate r and burst b, with b at least r, on HSIntro=5 relays. For a fixed set of k compliant introduction circuits, admitted requests over interval t are bounded by the sum of their burst and refill allowances. This is native early admission with bounded admitted work rate, not merely encryption or a response-byte cap.
Assessment method
Primary documentation and pinned source review; no runtime experiment
Source context
Tor DOS_PARAMS introduction admission and token-bucket limits
Outstanding qualification
Credit is conditional on enabled limits at all active introduction points, including overlap during circuit rotation. Token checking and upstream circuit processing still consume resources; a malicious introduction relay can disregard the policy. The bound does not establish total memory, CPU availability, network-wide protection or fairness to authorized clients. Client authorization remains separate. No PoW extension is selected, no default-on assumption is made, and no runtime or service-floor measurement was performed.
Public sources
Editorial evidence references
The following identifiers refer to research records not included in this public package; they are not public links.
- round540.html
- round540-sources.json