F15-LT: No
Rationale
The selected LTP/Encapsulation/AOS composition has no selected segment-authentication extension or link-security admission. LTP maintains reception state for incoming segments before the upper-layer bundle can be verified by BPSec. RFC 5326 explicitly identifies queue flooding and storage exhaustion and lists the authentication extension among mitigations. Contact scheduling, engine mapping, retransmission limits and replay handling do not supply the missing authorization gate. The selected ingress therefore does not establish F15 protection before LTP reception/reassembly work.
Assessment method
Primary documentation and pinned source review; no runtime experiment
Source context
RFC 5326 receiver state and security considerations; selected LTP/AOS composition
Outstanding qualification
This verdict concerns the declared composition, not every LTP deployment. LTP authentication extensions and secured links exist but are not silently added. BPSec and the separate final-delivery policy remain credited for their bundle/application boundaries; they do not authenticate incoming LTP control or data segments before their processing. No claim that LTP lacks resource limits, nor that a hostile transmitter can access every mission link, is made. No attack, executable AOS binding or whole-stack resource-budget test was run. TCPCL/TLS-based BP and CGR columns are evaluated separately.
Public sources
- https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5326.html#section-9.1
- https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5326.html#section-8.2
- https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5326.html#section-9.2
Editorial evidence references
The following identifiers refer to research records not included in this public package; they are not public links.
- round548.html
- round548-sources.json