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F15-CJ: Yes

Rationale

In the selected private-peering deployment, InterfaceController requires authenticated incoming handshakes and only installs a returned session as a switch peer. Failed handshakes return no admitted peer. SwitchCore stores interfaces in a fixed array bounded by NumberCompress_INTERFACES and rejects insertion when full; InterfaceController then frees the candidate peer. Authentication failures and non-established transit-directed messages are also rejected before switch dispatch. This combines admission with bounded interface-slot state at the local peer-to-switch boundary.

Assessment method

Primary documentation and pinned source review; no runtime experiment

Source context

Pinned cjdns private-peer admission and fixed switch interface array

Outstanding qualification

Retain private credentials and no public beacon advertisement. This is a bound on switch slots, not on total peer/session memory or handshake CPU. The legacy CryptoAuth branch creates a temporary session before authentication, scans the configured user list, and only rejects a missing/unrecognized authenticator before shared-secret work; a matching authenticator is not yet proof of the secret. The Noise branch performs handshake cryptography before enforcing user authorization. Neither branch is credited as cost-free admission, and no Noise-only cookie defense is needed for this verdict. Lower receive buffers, concurrent attempts, routing discovery and the separate route server are outside the bound. Credential holders may still exhaust capacity. No runtime or availability guarantee.

Public sources

Editorial evidence references

The following identifiers refer to research records not included in this public package; they are not public links.