F15-BL: No

Rationale

The selected IPv6/Babel composition has no Babel-MAC or Babel-DTLS admission layer. RFC 8966 requires creation of neighbor state after a Hello from a previously unknown neighbor, while its security section explains that base Babel trusts unauthenticated UDP information. Link-local scope limits remote injection but does not establish admission or a resource budget against on-link senders. The selected prefix filters constrain accepted routes, not the preceding per-neighbor control work; ordinary IP datagrams also lack an added admission layer.

Assessment method

Primary documentation and pinned source review; no runtime experiment

Source context

NFD PIT allocation ordering and RFC 8966 base-Babel neighbor admission

Outstanding qualification

This No is scoped to the declared base-Babel profile, including its configured route filters. It does not deny malformed-packet rejection, loop prevention, timers or output pacing. Those mechanisms do not provide the required combined protected boundary for unauthorized input. An access-controlled or quota-enforced implementation needs its own explicit selected policy and bounds. RFC 8967/8968 authentication extensions could change the composition but are deliberately excluded here; no claim is made that authentication alone would settle resource protection. Neither exploitability nor a quantitative service floor was tested. F26 remains separate.

Public sources

Editorial evidence references

The following identifiers refer to research records not included in this public package; they are not public links.

round538.html
round538-sources.json