F06-RA: Yes
Rationale
The explicitly selected two-end-host upper DIF applies native SDU encryption between its only two member IPCPs. Lower routed DIFs carry the protected upper PDUs without holding the upper keys. Thus application payload is protected between the compared endpoint hosts, rather than merely on each transit adjacency.
Assessment method
Native architecture and pinned SDU/RMT source inspection; no runtime or attack experiment
Source context
RINA recursive protection placement and IRATI default SDU crypto policy
Outstanding qualification
Requires applications to use the protected upper DIF, with only the endpoint hosts admitted to it and correctly pinned peer keys. Encrypting a multi-member transit DIF alone would not establish this result: its RMT removes ingress protection before forwarding. The added composition uses native recursion, not application TLS. Source/architecture evidence only; no runtime or cryptographic audit.
Public sources
- https://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_gr/NGP/001_099/009/01.01.01_60/gr_ngp009v010101p.pdf
- https://github.com/IRATI/stack/blob/726b535c908f8a74e8c68dd493cfbb1bd8726546/kernel/rmt.c
- https://github.com/IRATI/stack/blob/726b535c908f8a74e8c68dd493cfbb1bd8726546/kernel/sdup.c
- https://github.com/IRATI/stack/blob/726b535c908f8a74e8c68dd493cfbb1bd8726546/kernel/sdup-crypto-ps-default.c
- https://github.com/IRATI/stack/blob/726b535c908f8a74e8c68dd493cfbb1bd8726546/README.md
Editorial evidence references
The following identifiers refer to research records not included in this public package; they are not public links.
- round666.html