F05-RA: Yes
Rationale
The selected enrollment mode retains local peer-name/public-key admission bindings independently of session state. Each new authentication context reloads the expected peer key by name; a missing or unreadable binding fails authentication. With the same authorized peer configuration retained across Ethernet/Wi-Fi carrier changes, the IPCP can establish a new session under the existing admission decision.
Assessment method
Pinned source inspection of selected admission and forwarding policies; no runtime/security test
Source context
IRATI peer-key admission and authenticated SDU forwarding
Outstanding qualification
Scope is IPCP enrollment authority and peer continuity, not application roles or preservation of live transport state. This credits persistent configured admission bindings plus their mandatory verification, not merely possession of a stable key. The default authorization policy accepts successfully authenticated members; additional per-application restrictions are not inferred. Reusing the configuration does not establish revocation of already active sessions.
Public sources
- https://github.com/IRATI/stack/blob/726b535c908f8a74e8c68dd493cfbb1bd8726546/librina/src/security-manager.cc
- https://github.com/IRATI/stack/blob/726b535c908f8a74e8c68dd493cfbb1bd8726546/rinad/src/ipcp/plugins/default/security-manager-ps.cc
- https://github.com/IRATI/stack/blob/726b535c908f8a74e8c68dd493cfbb1bd8726546/README.md
Editorial evidence references
The following identifiers refer to research records not included in this public package; they are not public links.
- round669.html