Participant Relationship Protocol

Back to matrix

F05-CG: Yes

Rationale

The selected bounded F16 configuration already retains an ION/BSL APPOUT policy requiring primary-and-payload BIB verification with a locally named pairwise key and rejection on failure. The key is shared only with the single authorized remote sender, not transit. Retaining this admission rule and key registry across transport teardown lets subsequent bundles from that peer be authorized independently of the former convergence-layer session. ION loads policy and key-registry files separately from transport connections. The policy, rather than EID stability or queued bundles, supplies the retained authorization context. The old No omitted this selected native gate.

Assessment method

Selected-profile consistency correction; no runtime execution

Source context

Pinned ION/BSL policy loading and the selected native APPOUT admission witness

Outstanding qualification

Credit is limited to one authorized remote sender at a time under the existing F16 witness. Retain the configured rule and key registry when replacing transport/contact state; changing the authorized peer still requires the documented revocation cutover. The wildcard rule does not authenticate an arbitrary claimed source EID; continuity identifies the unique remote key holder. This is documentary capability, not a new ION execution, seamless mobility, automatic discovery or permission recovery. Reachability and native link provisioning remain separate. Complete TCPCL/TLS or LTP/Encapsulation/AOS integration and SABR mapping remain unqualified where already recorded; this decision concerns the retained BP endpoint policy. No new application authentication layer or profile change.

Public sources

Editorial evidence references

The following identifiers refer to research records not included in this public package; they are not public links.