F04-LT: Yes
Rationale
In the declared exact-origin pairwise-key profile, the source EID selects a configured security policy and is protected by primary-block integrity together with payload coverage. Verification is independent of LTP engine/channel locators. This is a pre-established cryptographic EID-to-key binding, not a self-certifying EID or public verification by arbitrary observers. The verifier also holds the symmetric key, so this is not nonrepudiation.
Assessment method
Specification plus pinned receiver-policy analysis; no runtime experiment
Source context
BIB-HMAC-SHA2 integrity scope and native EID-indexed receiver policy
Outstanding qualification
Keep the same EID/key policy while changing provisioned adjacent transport mapping; verify primary and payload authentication, reject source substitution and test wrong keys. Complete transport integration and secure key provisioning remain unqualified.
Public sources
- https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9173.html#section-3.2
- https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9172.html#section-6
- https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9758.html#section-5.5
- https://github.com/nasa-jpl/ION-DTN/blob/154a4cc7354b26661169f8d8b75a4002cd509a9f/bpv7/bpsec/policy/bpsec_policy_rule.c
Editorial evidence references
The following identifiers refer to research records not included in this public package; they are not public links.
- round193-sources.json