Participant Relationship Protocol

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E02-YG: Yes

Rationale

Dowling, Fischlin, Guenther and Stebila, Journal of Cryptology 34:37 (2021), publish a computational analysis of the final TLS 1.3 handshake and its staged key derivation, distinguishing authentication levels and their assumptions. The selected Yggdrasil composition explicitly includes TLS 1.3 peer transport. Pinned tls.go configures Go crypto/tls, and link_tls.go creates TLS dialers/listeners. This is an independent analysis of a security-critical protocol mechanism used in the selected composition, beyond a primitive review. E02 credits existence of bounded mechanism analysis, as already done for E02-MQ; it does not require or imply a whole-stack audit.

Assessment method

Published mechanism-analysis coverage, explicitly separated from implementation assurance

Source context

Dowling et al. (2021) TLS 1.3 analysis and pinned Yggdrasil transport source

Outstanding qualification

Credit the TLS 1.3 handshake component only. The pinned configuration skips normal certificate-chain verification, has permissive verification callbacks and does not request client certificates. Consequently this source does not establish Yggdrasil peer authentication or satisfaction of the proof assumptions by its trust/pinning integration. Ironwood routing, native end-to-end encryption, metadata authentication, TLS padding, composition and Go implementation are not audited by this paper. The dialer also allows TLS 1.2; the finding concerns the selected TLS 1.3 case, not every connection the implementation permits. Academic authors/affiliations and funding are documented in round292; no additional conflicts audit. No security guarantee, runtime test, benchmark or new source-code audit is inferred.

Public sources

Editorial evidence references

The following identifiers refer to research records not included in this public package; they are not public links.