E02-MQ: Yes
Rationale
Dowling, Fischlin, Guenther and Stebila (Journal of Cryptology 34:37, 2021) give a computational multi-stage analysis of the final TLS 1.3 handshake, including certificate-authenticated ephemeral Diffie-Hellman and mutual authentication. This is protocol key-establishment analysis, not just a primitive review. RFC 9001 sections 3 and 4.4 identify this handshake and client authentication as selected QUIC mechanisms. Multipath draft-21 section 2 negotiates support during that handshake and applies its changed AEAD construction after completion. E02 therefore has a scoped witness for the selected TLS handshake component.
Assessment method
Published computational analysis with explicit selected-component mapping
Source context
Dowling et al. (2021), TLS 1.3 full-handshake analysis; RFC 9001 sections 3/4.4; multipath draft-21 section 2
Outstanding qualification
The proof assumes its stated signature, hash, key-derivation and Diffie-Hellman security conditions. It does not prove the QUIC/TLS composition, transport-parameter binding, multipath nonce construction, path validation, migration, scheduling, local certificate allowlist or implementation. No claim that the base QUIC record proof automatically covers multipath. Authors list ETH Zurich, TU Darmstadt and University of Waterloo; acknowledgements disclose public academic funding, not commissioning by the compared implementation. They are separate from the selected RFC/draft author teams; no additional conflicts audit is claimed. No runtime execution or whole-stack certification.
Public sources
- https://doi.org/10.1007/s00145-021-09384-1
- https://d-nb.info/1255501162/34
- https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9001.html
- https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-quic-multipath-21.html
Editorial evidence references
The following identifiers refer to research records not included in this public package; they are not public links.
- round292-sources.json