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E02-LI: Yes

Rationale

Mahdi Aiash (Middlesex University), A Novel Security Protocol for Resolving Addresses in the Location/ID Split Architecture (NSS 2013), section 3.2, publishes a Casper/FDR analysis of basic LISP mapping. It models ITR, Map-Server and ETR exchanges and tests secrecy and authentication assertions against an active intruder. The author is distinct from the selected RFC author team. This qualifies as published third-party analysis of a critical protocol mechanism. RFC 9301 sections 5.2-5.4 and 8.3 retain the relevant non-proxy Map-Request/Map-Reply exchange and nonce correlation. The selected profile excludes LISP-SEC; registration authentication is not equivalent to authenticating every mapping reply.

Assessment method

Published academic formal analysis; bounded mechanism mapping, no execution

Source context

Aiash, NSS 2013, section 3.2; RFC 9301 sections 5.2-5.4 and 8.3

Outstanding qualification

Credit only the historical basic mapping analysis. Its later encrypted exchanges and proposed key-agreement protocol are not selected LISP. Nonce secrecy is a model assertion, not automatically a requirement of RFC 9301; reported model attacks do not establish a current implementation vulnerability. No full-stack audit, validation of registration changes, or formal proof of RFC 9301 is claimed. Academic affiliation establishes disclosed provenance, not an independent investigation of all conflicts of interest. No implementation or runtime test was performed.

Public sources

Editorial evidence references

The following identifiers refer to research records not included in this public package; they are not public links.