E02-IL: Yes
Rationale
Kadi, Suleiman and Jammoul (HIAST, Damascus), IJERT 10(1), January 2021, sections III and V, analyze ILCC state growth and experimentally attack the St Andrews Linux 4.9 ILNPv6 prototype. Their authorship and institution are distinct from the RFC authors and the assessed implementation team. The experiment exercises network-layer cache allocation using forged correspondent identifiers and reports resource-exhaustion behavior. This is published external experimental security assessment of a native mechanism, using the same bounded rule as E02-ND. RFC 6741 section 5 requires the logical ILCC for ILNP communication, including the selected TCP composition.
Assessment method
External experimental security assessment; bounded mechanism mapping
Source context
Kadi, Suleiman and Jammoul, Caching in ILNP (2021), sections III/V; RFC 6741 section 5
Outstanding qualification
Credit the assessment of the St Andrews baseline, not independent validation of the researchers’ own replacement policy. The attack workload uses UDP; its numerical results and exploitability are not transferred to the selected TCP profile or later implementations. The proposed ICMP handshake is not added to this column. This is experimental mechanism analysis, not formal verification or a complete implementation audit. Independence is inferred from disclosed authorship and affiliations, not an investigation of private relationships. No new attack, runtime test, interoperability test or security certification was performed. E01, E03, E04, F15 and G05 remain unchanged.
Public sources
- https://www.ijert.org/research/caching-in-ilnp-identifier-locator-communication-cache-ilcc-implementation-using-three-way-handshake-IJERTV10IS010043.pdf
- https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6741.html#section-5
Editorial evidence references
The following identifiers refer to research records not included in this public package; they are not public links.
- round639.html