Participant Relationship Protocol

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D01-PI: Yes

Rationale

The documented Linux portable PRP path separates session/connection processing from its application-supplied transport. The provider supplies userspace randomness, time, storage and software cryptography; a normal IPv4/UDP socket on a high port and user-owned keys/storage require no elevated networking authority. This is a concrete plausible ordinary-user composition after network provisioning, rather than a requirement to use the default privileged PRP kernel dataplane.

Assessment method

Documentary ordinary-user plausibility; no complete privilege execution

Source context

Pinned PRP portable runtime/provider documentation and Linux datagram facilities

Outstanding qualification

Plausibility only: the retained portable gate injects transport records, and the complete 0x0202 UDP endpoint has not been executed under a checked UID/capability set. Explicitly select the portable path with ordinary sockets and user-owned state; a kernel-ring or privileged continuing helper is not this witness. Initial network/firewall/package provisioning remains separate. No transfer to native Ethernet D01-PN, which has a distinct raw-packet authority boundary.

Public sources

Editorial evidence references

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