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D01-BA: Yes

Rationale

A QEMU/KVM Debian 13 guest with stock Linux 6.12.101+deb13-amd64 and batman-adv 2024.2 exchanged 16 native Ethernet requests and replies between two bat0 endpoints over a veth link. BATMAN_IV was explicitly selected and independently read back through generic netlink at both endpoints. Before all payload traffic, both application processes permanently dropped to UID/GID 65534, cleared supplementary groups, enabled no_new_privs and verified zero effective/permitted/inherited/ambient capabilities. Both denied root reacquisition and creation of another raw socket, while sending and receiving through their provisioned descriptors. No IP/UDP payload or continuing privileged userspace forwarding helper was used.

Assessment method

Sixteen bidirectional request/reply transactions after permanent privilege drop; kernel algorithm readback and negative privilege controls

Source context

Executed QEMU/KVM native Ethernet experiment; Linux and packet socket documentation

Outstanding qualification

Privileged installation, kernel module loading, namespace/interface provisioning and AF_PACKET socket creation are required and disclosed. The Yes concerns routine operation on the provisioned endpoint, not permissionless socket creation or a kernel-module-free stack. The retained socket is an explicitly delegated networking resource. This single-guest, two-namespace, one-link experiment does not establish multihop/radio behavior, bonding, mobility, performance, isolation against malicious raw-frame applications or full-profile interoperability. Small frames were used; the 1500-byte underlay MTU warning is retained and large-frame behavior is unqualified. Initial module-parameter and ip-output diagnostic failures occurred before traffic; a later capture attempt produced no usable result. Only the retained final PASS is credited.

Public sources

Editorial evidence references

The following identifiers refer to research records not included in this public package; they are not public links.