C06-YG: No
Rationale
The selected Ironwood traffic encoding includes source and destination public keys outside the encrypted payload. Participating routers decode that structure and forward it with those keys retained. A forwarding node can therefore read the final-key pair even though it cannot decrypt the application payload.
Assessment method
Primary specification and pinned code review; no runtime experiment
Source context
Pinned Ironwood and Reticulum forwarding code
Outstanding qualification
The observer terminates an authorized peer transport. TCP/TLS can hide these fields from an external observer without link keys, but not from the forwarding participant. Independent logical-node keys between contexts do not hide an established flow. Public keys are protocol identities, not proof of civil identity; no cryptographic break is claimed.
Public sources
- https://github.com/Arceliar/ironwood/blob/d50055b11f5ec5b56ee4e56ba9a75261461821dc/network/traffic.go
- https://github.com/Arceliar/ironwood/blob/d50055b11f5ec5b56ee4e56ba9a75261461821dc/network/router.go
Editorial evidence references
The following identifiers refer to research records not included in this public package; they are not public links.
- round500.html
- round500-sources.json