Participant Relationship Protocol

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C06-TO: Yes

Rationale

Tor CircIDs are channel-local and change across the channels of a multi-hop circuit. Relay-message bodies, including StreamIDs, receive layered encryption. In the selected onion-service path, rendezvous joins two circuits without putting the client and service identity pair into a common visible end-to-end forwarding identifier.

Assessment method

Primary specification and pinned code review; no runtime experiment

Source context

Tor channel-local circuit IDs and pinned cjdns session handles

Outstanding qualification

An authorized relay knows its adjacent peers and local circuit mappings; a rendezvous node knows which two circuits it joins. These facts do not disclose the final identity pair in ordinary forwarding fields. This does not protect against compromised endpoints, collusion reconstructing all circuit mappings, active attacks or timing/volume correlation. The result is for onion services, not plaintext exit traffic, and does not independently qualify optional Conflux deployment.

Public sources

Editorial evidence references

The following identifiers refer to research records not included in this public package; they are not public links.