C06-RI: No
Rationale
In the selected route-over IPv6/RPL composition, authorized forwarding routers process the source and destination IPv6 addresses. End-to-end DTLS protects application records, not this IP peer pair. IEEE 802.15.4 link encryption is removed by authorized link participants before IPv6 forwarding; header compression changes representation rather than providing identity confidentiality.
Assessment method
Primary specification and pinned code review; no runtime experiment
Source context
BP primary blocks and routed IPv6 headers
Outstanding qualification
The observer is a participating RPL router with the required link access, not a passive outsider lacking IEEE 802.15.4 keys. Final DTLS keys remain unavailable to that router. RPL source-routing intermediates can temporarily occupy the IPv6 Destination Address field; the selected routing header identifies the remaining route and final destination. No DTLS-terminating gateway, civil-identity inference or payload decryption is asserted.
Public sources
- https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8200.html#section-3
- https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6554.html#section-3
- https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9147.html#section-4
Editorial evidence references
The following identifiers refer to research records not included in this public package; they are not public links.
- round499.html
- round499-sources.json