C06-RA: No
Rationale
The protected two-host upper DIF still needs a lower routed flow between its host IPCPs. An intermediary in that supporting DIF removes its incoming SDU protection and can read the lower PDU source/destination addresses and source/destination CEP identifiers. Those identifiers persist across forwarding in that DIF; its replicated directory associates registered upper IPCP names with attachment addresses. The endpoint-host association therefore remains visible at this transit scope even though the upper payload is encrypted.
Assessment method
Pinned packet-field and forwarding source inspection with explicit observer scope
Source context
IRATI PCI fields, RMT forwarding and per-DIF directory
Outstanding qualification
No for the selected recursive composition, using the supporting transit DIF as the observation boundary. It does not imply every physical access hop sees the same fields, nor that the observer decrypts application data or learns civil identities. Aggregating applications behind one host may hide individual application flows, but does not conceal the communicating endpoint-host pair. A distinct anonymity or relay composition would require separate assessment; no timing-correlation experiment.
Public sources
- https://github.com/IRATI/stack/blob/726b535c908f8a74e8c68dd493cfbb1bd8726546/kernel/pci.c
- https://github.com/IRATI/stack/blob/726b535c908f8a74e8c68dd493cfbb1bd8726546/kernel/rmt.c
- https://github.com/IRATI/stack/blob/726b535c908f8a74e8c68dd493cfbb1bd8726546/rinad/src/ipcp/flow-allocator.cc
- https://github.com/IRATI/stack/wiki/Software-architecture-overview
Editorial evidence references
The following identifiers refer to research records not included in this public package; they are not public links.
- round667.html