C06-BP: No
Rationale
The selected identified-source BPv7 traffic carries the destination EID and original source-node ID in the primary block. BPSec can authenticate this block but cannot encrypt it with a BCB. A forwarding bundle node therefore reads the final-pair references without the final payload keys; those references persist across bundle hops.
Assessment method
Primary specification and pinned code review; no runtime experiment
Source context
BP primary blocks and routed IPv6 headers
Outstanding qualification
Observation is at a participating bundle forwarder. TCPCL TLS protects the link from an outsider without traffic keys, but terminates at the bundle nodes. Independent identities between contexts do not hide the pair within a communication. BP permits a null anonymous source in other configurations; that is not the selected exact-origin authenticated composition and is not credited here. This verdict does not expose civil identities or encrypted payload contents.
Public sources
- https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9171.html#section-4.3.1
- https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9172.html#section-3.8
Editorial evidence references
The following identifiers refer to research records not included in this public package; they are not public links.
- round499.html
- round499-sources.json