C04-RI: No
Rationale
The selected ordinary DTLS handshake includes no specified camouflage or secret-gated probe-concealment policy. Its optional recognizable HelloRetryRequest/cookie exchange verifies address reachability and limits spoofing/amplification; it is not an active-probe identification defense.
Assessment method
Documentary mechanism review; no active probing or runtime test
Source context
CCNx request-state semantics and HIP/DTLS handshake specifications
Outstanding qualification
Evaluate an adversary able to reach the service on the admitted link but lacking the final-peer PSK. PSK authentication protects session admission, not a demonstrated indistinguishable response policy. This does not assert that every invalid binder triggers a reply or that custom implementations cannot suppress responses.
Public sources
Editorial evidence references
The following identifiers refer to research records not included in this public package; they are not public links.
- round266-sources.json