C04-GN: No
Rationale
The selected GNUnet 0.20.0 UDP TRANSPORT profile exposes address validation before a CORE/CADET application relationship. A well-formed PING naming the target public peer identity and a valid advertised UDP address reaches GST_validation_handle_ping; it constructs a signed PONG and sends through the transport plugin. The probe needs public target information, not the target private key or an application credential. Wrong-target/address probes may be dropped, and peer blacklisting can deny sessions; these are not a selected secret-gated camouflage mechanism. This is a bounded documentary counterexample to protocol-concealment credit, not proof that every scanner receives a response or that payload authentication is absent. Fragment ACK behavior is supplementary evidence only, not the basis of this verdict.
Assessment method
Primary-source control-flow analysis and bounded composition inference; no protocol execution
Source context
GNUnet 0.20.0 UDP receive path, TRANSPORT dispatch and address-validation source
Outstanding qualification
On the selected ordinary UDP listener, send a correctly formed address-validation PING for its known public identity/address from a fresh, non-blacklisted peer. Capture signed PONG and compare wrong target/address, replay and control-service cases. Verify blacklist lifecycle separately. No probe execution or measured fingerprint success rate claimed.
Public sources
- https://docs.gnunet.org/v0.20.x/developers/transport/transport.html
- https://ftpmirror.gnu.org/gnunet/gnunet-0.20.0.tar.gz
Editorial evidence references
The following identifiers refer to research records not included in this public package; they are not public links.
- round120-sources.json