C01-BP: Yes
Rationale
A singleton bundle destination can keep its EID and NODE-ID credentials while replacing its IP attachment. A bounded witness uses TCPCL active-only polling: after losing the old access, the destination establishes a fresh authenticated TCP/TLS session to a provisioned reachable relay, which can deliver bundles to the same EID through that session. The bundle sender does not substitute the destination EID.
Assessment method
Primary documentation and pinned source review; no runtime experiment
Source context
BP destination identity, TCPCL active-only polling and SABR contact routing
Outstanding qualification
The relay must associate the authenticated node with the unchanged destination and select its live session for forwarding; these routing and contact policies are provisioned, not discovered automatically by BP. Both accesses must permit the new connection and retain the same credentials and endpoint registration. Bundle lifetime, storage and retry policy limit recovery. Neither the old IP address nor its TCP connection is preserved. No unrestricted new-contact discovery, seamless stream, arbitrary partition recovery or runtime qualification is inferred.
Public sources
- https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9171.html#section-5.4
- https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9174.html#section-3.5
- https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9174.html#section-4.4.4
Editorial evidence references
The following identifiers refer to research records not included in this public package; they are not public links.
- round533.html
- round533-sources.json